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Abstract 
In a context of the emerging risks that may lead to the high speed rail accidents and so the deaths, the question is to 
know what the roles of different actors prescribed in the legal system and what instruments have been established, and 
whether the legal framework is sufficient to promote risk assessment. This research studied the European Union legal 
system and pointed out its experience that could be enlighting as well as its weaknesses.    
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1. Introduction 
As defined by International Union of Railways, High Speed Rail (HSR) is a rapidly expanding new transport mode 
(Miller et al., 2018) and is often described as the ―transport mode of the future‖. (International Union for Railways, 2012; 
Campos et al., 2009). The European Union defines high-speed rail as lines specially built for speeds greater than or equal 
to 250 km/h/155 mph, or lines that are specially upgraded with speeds greater than 200 km/h or 124 mph. (International 
Union of Railways, 2012). It is marketed as a sustainable alternative to air traffic. HSR technology is presented as a 
solution to congested roads and airports and as an efficient response for incremental demand in the coming years. In this 
context, the development of HSR has been a central feature of the past two decades transport infrastructure policy in the 
world, including for example, the European Union ( de Rus and Nombe, 2007), Korea, and China (BBC, 2017), where the 
high speed rail network has been rapidly developed in the past decades. The reason behind the fact that high-speed trains 
are getting increasingly popular is partly because high speed railway authorizes a reduction in transportation costs 
(Masson and Petiot, 2009), and can have positive impacts on spatial dispersion of economic activities and population 
(Sasaki et al., 1997), and partly because rail is a safer form of transportation than road, and building high-speed rail 
service will increase safety (Feigenbaum, 2013). However, high-speed rail is not completely away from dangers. After the 
Eschede derailment in Germany--- which killed 101 people and injured around 100 (Railway Gezette, 1998) ---, and the 
Wenzhou train collision--- where two high-speed trains travelling on the Yongtaiwen railway line collided on a viaduct in 
the suburbs of Wenzhou, Zhejiang province, China, killing 42 people and injuring another 192 (Xinhua, 2011) ---, high 
speed railway travel suddenly seemed "unsafe" to some people.  
In addition,in the summer of 2013 a very grave train accident occurred near the Spanish town of Santiago de Compostela. 
A high-speed train derailed on a bend about 3 kilometres outside of the train station at Santiago de Compostela. 79 people 
died and more than 140 persons were injured (Railway Gezette, 2016). As verified by research, safety is of particular 
interest for the users of HS systems while choosing a particular HS alternative. It is always related to the perceived risk of 
injury and/or death due to an accident (Janic, 2003). In this context, it creates, from the legal perspective, a necessasity to 
establish a risk assessment requirement/mechanism in order to prevent accidents against the high speed rail. This research 
analyzes the EU legal framework for risk assessment vis-à-vis the high speed rail. As such, it takes use of primarily the 
legal analysis approach, by analyzing the legal requirements concerning risk assessment against the high speed rail and 
control in European Union legal system. To a more specific sphere, the legal approach includes further: a doctrinal 
positive legal theory approach will be carried out, that is, to seek what the risk assessment of HSR in the jurisdiction legal 
systems; and an legal normative approach will also be implemented: describe the way something ought to be done 
according to a value position. 
2. The Sources of the European Union Law Regulating Risk Assessment in High Speed Rail 
The EU has an ambitious strategy for high speed rail: the creation of a single, efficient and competitive market for high 
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speed rail throughout Europe. According to the compilation by Ross, the rail system regulation requirement across the 
Community was mentioned as early as 195 1 Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC), though it was then from a unified transport system requirement perspective. The 1957 Treaty of Rome (Art.3) 
called for the establishment of the CTP, including ‗common rules applicable to international transport to or from the 
territory of a Member State‘ (Art. 75). After the birth of high speed rail, the EU is also increasingly --- particularly since 
earlier 1990s, --- involved in high speed rail system planning and constructing for the reason that it is expected as a 
catalyst for European development and integration (Ross, 1994). In the past decades, the regulations concerning high 
speed rail (though some of them regulate generally the transport system including the high speed system as well as the 
normal speed system ) have been issed. Among them, the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN) is a key element of 
European transport policy in regulating rail system, which established the interoperability principle of the trans-European 
high-speed rail system. Additionally, other directives and regulations involved the field of risk assessment in the high 
speed rail:   
Reference 
  




2004/0051 Directive 2004/51/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 amending Council Directive 
91/440/EEC on the development of the Community‘s 
railways 
30/04/2004 31/12/2005 
2004/0050 Directive 2004/50/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 amending Council Directive 
96/48/EC on the interoperability of the trans-European 
high-speed rail system and Directive 2001/16/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the 
interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail 
system 
30/04/2004  30/04/2006 
2004/0049 Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the 
Community‘s railways and amending Council Directive 
95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and 
Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway 
infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the 
use of railway infrastructure and safety certification 
(Railway Safety Directive)  
30/04/2004 30/04/2006 
2001/0016 Directive 2001/16/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 19 March 2001 on the interoperability of 
the trans-European conventional rail system 
20/04/2001 20/04/2003 
2001/0014 Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of 
railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges 
for the use of railway infrastructure and safety 
certification 
15/03/2001 15/03/2003 
2001/0013 Directive 2001/13/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council 
Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway 
undertakings 
15/03/2001 15/03/2003 
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2001/0012 Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council 
Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the 
Community's railways 
15/03/2001 15/03/2003 
1996/0048 Council Directive 96/48/EC of 23 July 1996 on the 
interoperability of the trans-European high-speed rail 
system 
17/09/96 08/04/99 
1995/0018 Council Directive 95/18/EC of 19 June 1995 on the 
licensing of railway undertakings  
27/06/95 27/06/97 
1991/0440 Council Directive 91/440/EEC of 29 July 1991 on the 
development of the Community's railways 
24/08/91 01/01/93 
Figure 1. Transport directives of the European Union: Rail transport 
 
Among the above laws, the Railway Safety Directive is most important. The Railway Safety Directive contains a number 
of concrete instruments for the effective management of railway safety, such as harmonised safety certification, vehicle 
authorization, supervision, or risk assessment. They are meant to support the overarching objective to create an internal 
market for railway vehicles and train services across Europe having no detrimental impact on railway safety. The revised 
Directive should contain some additional elements enabling an effective safety management at EU level, notably tangible 
safety targets, common occurrence reporting, harmonised supervision and improved risk management at EU level. The 
long-term objective of the Railway Safety Directive is the gradual reduction of national rules in order to move towards a 
more harmonised European approach to safety. Many of these national rules are redundant as common requirements have 
now been enacted at EU level. It is therefore timely to review and clarify the scope that remains for national safety rules in 
the Member States. Also, as substantiated by Agency reports and feedback from the sector, there is a need to increase 
transparency in how national safety rules are established, published and made available. 
All those operating the railway systems in the European Union are subject to the legal system above. This implies firstly 
that high speed rail is under regulation by the system; and secondly, there is an absence of a legal system tailored the high 
speed rail (this will be discussed further in later parts).  
The European Union Agency for Railways is established by Regulation (EU) 2016/796 (Article 1.1). Functionally, it is 
responsible for developing common safety targets and common safety methods, including among other things, Common 
safety method for risk evaluation and assessment. Generally, the European Union Agency for Railways made the CSM 
Rrisk Assessment in order to harmonise processes for risk evaluation and assessment and the evidence and documentation 
produced during the application of these processes (Koursi, 2007). In this way, the EU effectively hoarmonise the way 
(together through ) how the risk assessment shall be carried by the duty-holder. In addition, by applying a common 
process, it will be easier for an assessment undertaken in one EU Member State to be accepted in another with the 
minimum of further work. This is referred to as mutual recognition, for example, discussed by Scharpf (1994). Also, the 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1136 completes the revision of the CSM for risk evaluation and 
assessment initiated by the Commission Decision of 12.10.2010 (the Mandate). 
Common safety method for risk evaluation and assessment provides that: (a) if the change has an impact on safety the 
proposer must decide on whether it is significant or not by using criteria in the CSM Risk Assessment. (b) If the change is 
significant the proposer must apply the risk management process. If the change is not significant, the proposer must keep 
a record of how it arrived at its decision. In order to supervise the duty-holder‘s risk assessment obligation above, an 
assessment body must carry out an independent assessment of how the risk management process is applied and the results 
from the risk management process. The assessment body must meet criteria set out in Annex II of the CSM Risk 
Assessment. This includes meeting the requirements of the ISO/IEC 17020:2012 and being accredited or recognised.  
As mentioned above, this CSM gives a harmonised framework for the risk assessment process. This is realized through 
the prescription of hazard identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation, which will be also dicussed later. Specifically 
speaking, the risks include: (a)individual risks relating to passengers, staff including the staff of contractors, level crossing 
users and others, and, without prejudice to existing national and international liability rules, individual risks relating to 
unauthorised persons on railway premises (Article 7.4(a) of Directive 2004/49/EC); (b) societal risks. The social risks are 
included,. But what is social risks are not clearly defined, instead left to Member States. Furthere more, it requires the 
Member States to ensure the control of all risks associated with the activity of the infrastructure manager or railway 
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undertaking, including the supply of maintenance and material and the use of contractors (Article 9.2). 
Next to CSM Risk Assessment, The European Union Agency for Railways also introduced the Control Command and 
Signalling (CCS) TSI sets out the framework for the harmonization of the train detection, communication and train 
control systems on the High Speed and conventional railway network in Europe (European Union Agency for Railways, 
2016). In addition, recommendations relating to the risk assessment of buffer stops, arresting devices and 
end impact walls are set out in this instrument. It also provides practical and attentive assessment services is to high speed 
railway undertaking through the requirements of standards and norms to the processes of high speed railway undertaking.  
Safety supervision is assured at the national level by the National Safety Authorities, with two main instruments defined 
in the railway safety directive as audits and inspections, which will be discussed later. However, this does not mean that 
the EU law is doing nothing. As a matter of fact, the Railway Safety Directive requires that serious accidents are 
independently investigated by an independent National Investigation Body (NIB). 
In 2013, the European Railway Agency signed administrative arrangements with the Intergovernmental Organisation for 
International Carriage by Rail (OTIF) and the European Commission‘s Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 
(DG Move), establishing more effective collaboration and coordination. This will allow better coordination between the 
EU legislation on railway safety, which is mainly aimed at preventing the occurrence of accidents, and the RID 
requirements, which is mainly concerned with the classification of substances, their means of containment and loading/ 
unloading requirements. The Agency has also established a collaboration with the UNECE Joint Meeting of the 
ADR/RID/ ADN experts on the carriage of dangerous goods. 
3. Roles of Different Actors in High Speed Rail Risk Assessment 
Based on the above, it can be seen that the actors involved in the risk assement are: the infrastructure managers and 
railway undertakings, Naitonal Safety Authorities, Investigation Bodies. Generally, the first two have the ―full 
responsibility‖ for the safety of the system. The rest two are national bodies responsible for supervising whether the first 
two have carried out their risk assessment obligations. The roles of the four bodies will be examined as follows: 
3.1 The Infrastructure Managers’ Risk Assessment Obligations  
According to Directive 2004/49/EC, ‗infrastructure manager‘ means any body or undertaking that is responsible in 
particular for establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure (Article 3 (b)). The sector infrastructure management 
has been separated from railway undertakings so that competition could grow within the railway service sector 
(Directorate-General For Internal Policies: Policy Department Budgetary Affairs, 2015; Nash, 2010; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2006). Due to this, the management is seen as an independent entity bearing obligations in the 
European legal system, which is reflected in, inter alia, the Preamble (5) of the Directive 2004/49/EC, reading as: ―All 
those operating the railway system, infrastructure managers and railway undertakings, should bear the full responsibility 
for the safety of the system, each for their own part‖. 
To that end, the infrastructure mangers are obliged to evaluate the risk either quantitatively or qualitatively, or both when 
necessary (Annex 1, 2.5.1 of Regulation (EU) No 402/2013).  They should cooperate in implementing risk control 
measures. Specifically speaking, they should apply the methods for monitoring set out in the common safety methods as 
mentione before, which adopts the prescription of hazard identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation, as demonstrated 
in the follow picture. 
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Picture 1. the Risk Assessment Mechnism Provided by the CSM (Farrington-Darby, 2005) 
 
The CSMs gives a broad framework for the use of risk assessment methodologies to assess changes to the high speed 
railway system. Here it is also worth mentioning that, based on the CSM regulation, Member States can make their own 
standards. For example, the UK‘s Common Safety Method for risk evaluation and Assessment Guidance on the 
application of Commission Regulation (EU) 402/2013, which impose any specific tools and techniques to be used in an 
risk estimation against rail in order to carry out the requirments in the CSM regulation. In this regard, the infrastructure 
mangers‘ obligation arising from common safety manage regulation might be different across the member states. Yet, the 
difference is not significant as the obligations are based on the same requirements. 
Specifically speaking, the CSM regulation requires the high speed infrastructure managers the risk assessment obligations 
as follows: (1) identifying the hazardous events which have the potential to cause injury or death to passengers and the 
high speed rail workers; (2) identifying the precursors (i.e. the component, sub-system or system failures, physical effects, 
human error failures or operational conditions), which can result in the occurrence of each hazardous event; (3) 
identifying the control measures that are in place to control or limit the occurrence of each precursor that cannot be 
eliminated;  
Furthermore, the high speed rail infrastructure managers also have the obligation to implement a safety management 
system, fulfilling Community requirements and containing common elements (preamble (13) of Directive 2004/49/EC). 
In order to able to keep how the requirement is in hand, the European system further requires that the information on 
safety and the implementation of the safety management system should be submitted to the safety authority in the 
Member State concerned  (preamble (13) ).  
Next to the above, every infrastructure manager has a key responsibility for the safe design, maintenance and operation of 
its rail network (preamble (13) ).  In addition, the Member States are asked to make a clear distinction between this 
immediate responsibility for safety and the safety authorities' task of providing a national regulatory framework and 
supervising the performance of the operators. 
Also importantly, the infrastructure managers bear the obligation to esbalish the safety management system (Article 9). 
According to the EU law, the ‗safety management system‘ means the organisation and arrangements established by an 
infrastructure manager or a railway undertaking to ensure the safe management of its operations (Article 3 (i)). In order to 
be allowed to manage and operate a rail infrastructure the infrastructure manager must obtain a safety authorization from 
the safety authority in the Member State where he is established. The safety authorisation shall comprise the following 
elements: (a) authorisation confirming acceptance of the infrastructure manager‘s safety management system; and  (b) 
authorisation confirming acceptance of the provisions of the infrastructure manager to meet specific requirements 
necessary for the safe design, maintenance and operation of the railway infrastructure including, where appropriate, the 
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maintenance and operation of the traffic control and signaling system (Article 11.1). 
 
Figure 2. Safety Authorisation Information Flow for Infrastructure Managers (Koursi, 2007) 
 
The safety authority in the above Figure means national safety authority, whose role will be discussed in later parts. The 
authorization is an important instrument, because by it provides control by the national govenments over the 
compenetence of infrastructure manager, including among other things, the risk assessment.  Furthermore, according to 
the compilation by Koursi, the infrustucture‘s safety authorization must be renewed, at the latest, every five years after the 
intial authorization by the safety authority. This requirement is also reflected in the above figure. The law obligates the 
infrutsture manager to inform the relevant safety authroties, without delay, in the event of any substantial changes to the 
infrastructure, signaling or energy supply or to the principles of its operation and maintenance (Koursi, 2007).  
Lastly, the manager is obliged to submit ananual report, which at least partly concerns the risk assessment.  Specifically 
speaking, all infrastructure managers shall submit safety reports. These reports include: (a) information on how the 
organisations corporate safety targets are met; the results of planned safety activity; development of national safety 
indicators; (c) the results of internal safety auditing; (d) observations on deficiencies and malfunctions of railway 
operations and infrastructure management that might be relevant for the safety authority (Article 9.4 of the Directive 
2004/49/EC).    
Although the EU law prescribe the above reuiqrements towards the risk assessment obligations vis-à-vis the high speed 
rail infrastructure, it is, however, mostly insufficient because it fail to prescribe, at the EU level, the consequences against 
the infrastucturers and the railway understakings in case where they fail to carry out the above requirements. This has the 
risk to leading to varying sanctions against law breaches by infrastructure managers.  
3.2 Railway Undertakings’ Risk Assessment Obligations 
The Directive 2001/14/EC defined the "railway undertaking" as any other public or private undertaking, the activity of 
which is to provide transport of goods and/or passengers by rail on the basis that the undertaking must ensure 
traction(Article 2.(k)). Railway undertakings in the European Union Member States are including for example, Deutsche 
Bahn AG (DB) (Note 1), the French SNCF (Note 2) and the Italian Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. (Note 3), the Dutch 
Railway( Note 4). Similar to what is noted in the role of the infrastructure manager, there is also a legislative requirement 
for the railway understakings. The legal basis for that railway understakings are seen as being responsible for risk 
assessment lies in the Directive 2004/49/EC. Here, it discusses the risk assessment role of the railway understaking 
operating on the high speed rail.  
Firstly, they are obliged to establish a safety management system--- the organisation and arrangements to ensure the safe 
management of the operations. They are also obliged to implement the safety management system during their rountine 
operations. (Preamble (13)). The safety management has a risk assessment manger as its integral part. Secondly, the 
Railway Safety Directive requires the railway undertakings to hold a safety certificate issued by the national safety 
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authority to access the railway infrastructure (Preamble (15)). The safety certificate should give evidence that the railway 
undertaking has established its safety management system (including risk assessment) and is able to carry out the risk 
assessment and comply with the relevant safety standards and rules (Preamble (15)). These requirements form the risk 
assessment measure: the safety certification of railway undertakings.  As part of the certification process, national safety 
authority assesses its Safety Management System. Thirdly, like what is examined in the role of the infrastructure 
managers, the high speed rail understakings have the obligation to carry out the common safety methods as well. The 
application of the common safety methods on risk assessment will enable the railway understaking to control the risks that 
arise from changes to the railway system. 
3.3 National Safety Authorities 
The Railway Safety Directive required the Member States to set up two national authorities with defined competences in 
the field of railway safety: national safety authorities (NSA) and national investigating bodies (NIB). The role of NIB will 
be dicussed later. The NSAs have the task of monitoring the safety regulatory framework and supervising railway safety. 
They issue the safety authorizations to infrastructure managers and safety certificates to railway undertakings of high 
speed rail. The Regulation (EU) No1077/2012 requires the National Safety Authorities (NSAs) to oversee the safety 
performance of the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers operating in their respective Member State. For that 
purpose, the National Safety Authorities can adopt various techniques for supervision, ranging from management system 
audits to inspections in the field as the NSAs are imposed by the railway safety directive the two main instruments: audits 
and inspections. NSAs often use a combination of audits and inspections in their annual supervision plans to ensure that 
appropriate risk assessment requirements are met. Specifically speaking, the inspectors shall carry out inspections against 
the risk assessment obligation of the duty-holders (the above two actors) as irregular checks of the specific procedures or 
operations. The safety audits are typically the result of longer-term planning and follow a well-established comprehensive 
procedure. They are also required to do so with the ―greatest possible professional integrity and the greatest possible 
technical competence‖ (Article 1, Annex VII, Directive 2001/16/EC). Meanwhile, the Directive also granted the 
inspectors free from, among other things, financial pressure. That is to say, they shall be paid to perform inspections.  
National safety authorities should coordinate their supervision activities against risk assessment in relation to high speed 
railway undertakings established in different Member States, and should share information among themselves and, where 
appropriate, with the European Railway Agency (Article 28, in Preamble of Directive (EU) 2016/798). Lastly, the NSAs 
are also oliged to publish the safety reports. However this requirement is not prescribed in the legal system at the EU level, 
instead it is left to the Member States to require so. After examing, it is argued that almost all the Member States have 
expreslly provided this requirement, except some eastern European countries, such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Latvia.  
3.4 Investigation Bodies 
The revision of the first Regulation (EC) No352/2009 on the CSM for risk assessment clarifies the requirements for the 
independent assessment body referred to in Article 6 of that Regulation. This is legal basis for the member states to 
establish the investigation bodies. Furthermore, Regulation (EU) No. 402/2013 defines the criteria to be fulfilled by the 
assessment body and the necessary requirements for the accreditation or recognition of its competence in order to achieve 
a similar quality of independent assessment regardless on whether the assessment body is accredited or recognised. 
The Investigation Bodies are permanent bodies, independent of rail actors and separate from the judicial inquiry, in charge 
of investigating serious accidents. Regarding the detailed compentence of the investigation bodies, the EU law set up a 
general requirement. The detailed requirements are left to Member States to regulate. In building the domestic legal 
framework, the investigation bodies of Member States are required to ensure that the responsibility for the safe operation 
of the railway system and the control of risks managers and railway undertakings.( preamble (5) of Directive 2004/49/EC). 
Furthermore, the national law ought to include an obligation to implement necessary risk assessment and risk control 
measures, to establish safety management systems (preamble (5) of Directive 2004/49/EC). However, the information 
available to the ERA also shows that the approach to supervision differs substantially between Member States 
4. The Legal Prevention Measures  
Based on the above examination, the legal measures used to promote risk assessment are here concluded in order to 
have a more clear picture of the European system. 
4.1 Safety Management System 
One of the elements of the EU law is the reuiqment for a safety management system which meets certain criteria and is 
certified by the safety authority. And both the infrasture manager and understakings of high speed railway are obliged to 
so do. This legal instrument is important to risk assessment, because it is per se an integral part of the safety 
management system and as such, the risk assessment becomes the routine management task of the above two parties 
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required by law. This is not only in line with the purpose of risk assessment, that is to identify the control measures 
needed to control risks in the high speed rail, but also in line with the fact that risk assessments form the foundation of 
safety management systems.  
4.2 Safety Certification  
The EU‘s ultimate aim is to establish a common safety certificate with Community validity at, among other things, the 
legal level. This is well reflected in the Rail Safety Directive (preamble (15)). To this end, the EU system adopts the 
certificate instrument. The Railway Safety Directive requires the railway undertakings (RUs) to hold a safety certificate 
issued by the national safety authority (NSA) to access the railway infrastructure.The purpose of the safety certificate is to 
provide evidence that the railway undertaking has established its safety management system and can meet requirements 
laid down in TSIs and other relevant Community legislation and in national safety rules in order to control risks and 
operate safely on the network (Article 10.1).  
Through the certification instrument, the legal system can empower the high speed rail safety authority to control whether 
the invovlving parties meet the safety requirements provided by law , so as observed in the EU system. Meanwhile, risk 
assessment is a dynamic process that enables the high speed infrasture mangers and understakings to proactively manage 
high speed risks. With the development of high speed rail safety technology, the risks assessment knowledge is 
continuously developing correspondingly. Completing a certificate program indicates that safety certification holderare 
committed to staying current in the high speed rail risk assessment field, have attained a higher level of expertise and have 
the discipline to work toward a specific safety goal. While there has been a sound progress in the implementation of the 
legal requirement, there is a need for reflection on how to further harmonise the work of the certification bodies. Also, the 
performance of certification issurance is different among the Member States, which is presented in the following picture. 
The part A safety certificate is valid throughout the EU; while the part B certificate is vaild exclusively in the Member 
State where the certificate is issued.  
 
Picture 2. Number of valid Safety Certificates — Part A and B per Member State (ERADIS – 1.1.2016) (European 
Railway Accident Information Links, 2017) 
 
4.3 Common Safety Targets (CSTs)  
The Safety Directive presents Common Safety Targets (CSCTs) as the safety levels that must at least be achieved by 
different parts of the railway system in relation to different groups of individuals that are using the railways or being 
exposed to risks arising from high railway traffic indirectly. The CSM applies to 'any change of the railway system in a 
Member State … which is considered to be significant within the meaning of Article 4 of this Regulation [ie, the CSM 
itself].In nature, CSTs are quantitative measures of risk assessing whether the current safety levels of the railways in the 
Member States are at least maintained. 
As compiled by RSSB, a british railway safety counseling company, the CSM facilitates 'access to the market for rail 
transport services' through harmonisation of: 
 'the risk management processes used to assess the safety levels and the compliance with safety requirements; the 
exchange of safety-relevant information between different actors within the rail sector in order to manage safety across 
the different interfaces which may exist within this sector; the [evaluation of] evidence resulting from the application of 
a risk management process.' (RSSB, 2017) 
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The proposer of a change in high speed rail operation is responsible for applying the risk management process set out in 
the CSM. The national safety authority --- in this seeting as the assessment body---, then provides 'an independent 
assessment of the correct application of the risk management process'.   
From the European Union‘s perspective, the reason to develop Common Safety Targets lies in that it can assure a short 
term control of safety performances and a long term convergence of safety performance in Europe, through the use of 
common ways of measuring and assessing safety performance on a macro level (European Union Agency For Railways, 
2017). 
Functionally speaking, the Common safety targets lay out detailed requirements for the risk assessment. It is also noted 
that CSTs are provided in the form of EU regulation, a binding legislative act, and as such it must be applied in its 
entirety across the EU. That implies that the risk assement requirements of CSTs can be (and shall be) directly 
implemented by member states. Nonetheless, there is noted an absence of a enforcement/coordination body at the EU 
level. As such it is arguable that the responsibility is still largely accorded to national authorities, namely, to the member 
states to deal with.  
4.4 Speed Limit 
In adidition to the above legal instruments, the EU law also takes use of speed limit to ensure safety. Commercial speed in 
many services is often limited due to, for example, proximity to densely urbanized areas (to ease the impact of noise and 
minimize the risk of accidents), or the existence of viaducts or tunnels (where speed must be reduced to 160-180 km/h for 
safety reasons). This creates the high speed rail infrastructure managers and understakings a risk assessment towards 
speed control according to the legal requirements. Any accidents involving dangerous goods may have catastrophic 
consequences in terms of human victims or environmental damage. This is why, in addition and without prejudice to the 
general EU legislation on railway safety, specific requirements on the classification, containment and loading/ unloading 
of substances apply. These requirements are definedin the RID (21) which is transposed in EU legislation by the EU 
Directive 2008/68 on the inland transport of dangerous goods (European Railway Accident Information Links, 2014). 
5. Discussion 
Based on the above research, it can be concluded that an effective legal norm for risk assessment in the high speed rail 
from the EU law experience shall be as follows: Firstly, the EU system has established a comprehensive railway risk 
assessment legal mechanism. It provides an effective framework imposing obligaitons on different involved actors and 
prescribing a series instruments to ensure the obligations are well carried out within the objective of safety.  Secondly, 
high speed rail system‘s operation is a complicated management subject involving environmental issues, train schedules, 
safety, rolling stock and infrastructure reliability (transport infrastructures are critical and vulnerable) (Transport Research 
& Innovation Portal, 2017). As such, the EU law takes use of mainly general requirements as observed in section 3, while 
the detailed rules are left to member states as well as the actors to establish.  
Meanwhile, throughout the above analysis, some weaknesses have been also found: Firstly, there is a lack of specialized 
high speed rail legsialtion at the EU level. This leads to that the risk assessment is regulated by rules scattered aomong the 
railway. A consequence is that the risk assessment requirement fails to be built on the full consideration of risks 
particularly related to high speed rail. Secondly, although the safety certification is widely adopted in the EU legal system,  
this legal instrument has its advantages in keeping the risk assessment. however, as pointed out before, the safety 
certification is not harmonized in throughout EU.  Thirdly, risk assessment method. Because it is set up in the form of law, 
it is mandatory to be carried out. Meanwhile, the method consists of detailed rules, and as such, is operational for the duty 
holders. However, the approach which relies on detailed rules is not competent to respond swiftly to technology 
deveolpments. As is known, the development in high speed rail is usually seen as impressively rapid. Therefore, the 
detailed ruels can easily become outdated. A possible solution might be that the risk assessment mehod swift to general 
rules, leaving implementing rules instead to high speed rail industry body, which can on the one side , it can create detailed 
rules on the basis of the requirements set up in the risk assessment method, and on the other side, it can also update rules 
in a more timely fashion.  Fourthly,  as examined in part 2, the risk assessment role of infrastructure managers are 
obviously larger than the railway understakings. The imbalanced obligation status quo is not reasonable, because the 
understakings of the high speed rail know the risks better as they operate the trains in a routine fashion.   
In conclusion, it could be argued that in the context that risk assessment in high speed rail encouters various tensions 
nowadays, the EU legal system is constantly endeavoring to find a balance by constructing theoretically rational and 
reasonable legal framework promoting risk assessment in the high speed rail on the one hand, while leaving room for 
other parties to regulate on the other hand.  
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Notes 
Note 1. Deutsche Bahn AG is a German railway company. Headquartered in Berlin, it is a private joint-stock company 
(AG), with the Federal Republic of Germany being its single shareholder. 
Note 2. SNCF is France's national state-owned railway company and manages the rail traffic in France and the 
Principality of Monaco. 
Note 3. Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A is a government-owned holding company that manages infrastructure and 
services on the Italian rail network. 
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